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JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1958
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By HAROLD E. HURST
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
During the calendar year of 1957 the Supreme Court of the State
of Colorado has considered and decided a number of cases controlled
by the principles of the state and federal constitutions. A number of
other cases were decided in which the reasons given for the decisions
indicated that the court may have had constitutional principles in mind,
but such principles were not specifically identified nor associated with
the Constitution. Only those cases are reported here in which the court
made it plain that its decision was dictated by one of our constitutions.
M- ,OTOR VEHICLE DEALERS CLOSED ON SUNDAY
Prior to the reconstitution of the court subsequent to the last gen-
eral election, the court held unconstitutional' the state law 2 prohibiting
the sale by dealers of motor vehicles on Sunday. Under the statute, the
definition of motor vehicles excluded vehicles not designed to operate
on the highways and vehicles used in the production, care or harvesting
of farm.crops. On rehearing, a majority of four justices-three of whom
were newly elected to the tribunal-held the Sunday closing law valid.3
The law was contested as being in violation of the due process clauses
of the state and federal constitutions, the equal protection clause of the
federal Constitution, and the prohibition against special legislation con-
tained in the state constitution.
Discriminatory legislation against a particular class or segment of
people or activities does not violate the constitutional prohibitions if it
can fairly be said that there is a real difference in law or in fact between
those discriminated against and those privileged, which difference bears
a reasonable relationship to the public health, welfare, safety or morals.4
The majority of the court readily recognized a real difference between
motor vehicle dealers and haberdasheries, and between automobile deal-
ers and real estate salesmen. Automobile dealers were different fron
any other kind of dealers because they (lealt in automobiles. The vice
of the decision lies in the fact that it is not only a difference which the
court must find, but a difference which gives rise to some special neces-
sit), for legislating against a utoinobile dealers to promote the public
welfare or safety-a necessity created by such dealers whicl does not exist
by virtue of Sunday operation of otheri kinds of business.
The motor vehicle Sunday closing law involves two discriminations:
(I) It prohibits the selling of motor vehicles except those not intended
to be used on the highways, and those which are to be used for produc-
tion, tending or harvesting farm crops; and (2) It prohibits selling of
motor vehicles while permitting the selling of sporting goods, household
I Mosko v. Dunbar, 8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 439 (1956).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann, § 13-20-1 et seq. (Suop. 1955).
2 Mosko v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
4 See e.g. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Asbury Hospital v. Cass County,
326 U.S. 207 (1945); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson. 316 U.S. 53., (1942): Tigner
v. Texas. 310 U.S. 141, 130 A.L.R. 1321 (1940); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co..
220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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furniture, houses, groceries, clothing-in short, everything but motor
vehicles.
The majority attempted to gloss over the first exception and lightly
ridiculed the idea that there was any exception at all.5 The white-wash
is not convincing, and seems to be ably answered by Mr. Justice Knauss
in dissent:
"Under this exception dealer 'A' having a place of business
directly across the street from dealer 'B' could remain open
for business on the Sabbath day because he had for sale farm
tractors, trucks, machines and tools used in the production,
harvesting and care of farm products. At the same time dealer
'A' might have on his premises a dozen or a hundred motor
vehicles as defined in the limited language of the 1955 Act.
It will not do to say that dealer 'A' cannot sell one of his motor
vehicles on Sunday, for he is permitted to remain open, attract
customers by advertising and otherwise make contacts with the
buying public, while dealer 'B' (directly across the street) who
does not have a farm tractor or dump truck on his lot must
remain closed. We would be naive indeed if we believed that
trucks and motor vehicles, even under the limited definition of
the Act, are not used in the 'harvesting and care of farm prod-
ucts.' ''
One asks: Is there any justification in terms of promoting the
public health, welfare, safety and morals, in permitting the farmer to
buy a pick-up truck on Sunday, while denying the cement contractor
the same opportunity?
The majority didn't even see the problem of equal protection of
the laws and of special legislation involved in drawing the line between
motor vehicles and other commodities such as furniture, second-hand
merchandise or what-have-you. The principal authority relied upon
by the majority was an opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
7
written by the highly-respected Chief Justice Vanderbilt. But Chief
Justice Vanderbilt didn't see the problem of equal protection either.
He fell into the same error as did the Colorado majority. He under-
stood that all motor vehicle dealers were to be closed on Sunday; thus,
everyone was being treated alike and consequently there was no denial
of equal protection. But, as indicated above, the question is not simply
"Are all persons in the defined class treated equally?" but also "Is the
class properly defined-are all persons whose activity presents the same
kind or degree of dangers to the public health, welfare, safety and morals
included in the class?"
That such a difference is necessary is clear even from the United
States Supreme Court decision cited by the majority of our state court
in support of its decision.
The principle is stated as follows in a leading case decided by the-
Supreme Court of the United States:
"The contention as to the various omissions which are
noted in the objections here urged ignores the well-established
principle that the Legislature is not bound, in order to support
5 309 P.2d at 587.
6 Id. at 596 (dissent).
7 Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71, 127 A.2d 566 (1956).
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the constitutional validity of its regulation, to extend it to
all cases which it might possibly reach. Dealing with practical
exigencies, the Legislature may be guided by experience ...
(Citing cases.) It is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it
may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the
need is deemed to be clearest. As has been said, it may 'pro-
ceed cautiously, step by step,' and 'if an evil is specially experi-
enced in a particular branch of business' it is not necessary that
the prohibition 'should be couched in all-embracing terms.' "I
One asks: Is there any difference in the kind or degree of' danger
to the public health, welfare, safety and morals as between the motor
vehicle dealer selling on Sunday on the one hand and the butcher, the
baker, the candle-stick maker on the other? The majority of the court
suggests none. Imagination supplies none.
RIGHT TO NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
The right to notice and hearing, as required by due process of law
before liberty or property can be taken, was the issue in two cases decided
during 1957.
The Denver ordinance popularly called the dog leash law,9 pro-
hibiting owners of dogs from permitting such animals to run loose,
came under attack on the ground that property was being taken and
destroyed without notice and hearing. The ordinance provides that
(logs running loose shall be impounded; that notice of the impound-
ment be given to the owner, if known; that if ownership is not known,
the description of the impounded dog must be posted at the pound;
and that dogs not claimed after three days shall be disposed of. The
court pronounced an unanimous decision'"-one justice not participat-
ing-which was soundly reasoned and well-documented, holding that if
notice and hearing were required by due process of law, the notice pro-
vided by the ordinance was adequate and reasonable under the circum-
stances."1
8 Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 29 (1924) (emphasis supplied).
9 Councilman's Bill No. 32, Series 1955, Referred Ordinance No. 80, Series 1955.
10 Thiele v. Denver, 312 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1957).
11 The decision seems to be adequately supported also by such decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States as: Miller v. Schoene. 276 U.S. 272 (1928); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1906); Lawton v. Steele. 152
U. S. 133 (1894).
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In the second case raising the question, 2 an original action was
begun in the supreme court, naming the councilmen and city clerk of
Colorado Springs as defendants. The defendants had allegedly illegally
rejected the majority of the signatures on a petition to submit a charter
amendment to the electors in the April election. The complaint re-
quested the court to declare the signatures legal and to require submis-
sion of the amendment to the voters. No service of process was made
upon the defendants. On March 13, a brief was filed in support of the
complaint and on March 14, the court considered the matter in confer-
ence. To serve the practical necessities of the plaintiffs, a decision from
the court was needed by not later than March 18, because publication
of the proposed charter amendment had to be made beginning on that
day. In such cases, the court follows the practice of issuing an order to
the defendants to show cause, allowing five days for the defendant to
make an appearance. In this case the court was compelled to rule that
to decide the legality of the signatures on the plaintiff's petition by
March 18 would require the giving of notice so deficient in time as to
deprive the defendants of their rights under the due process clause.
"Accepting at face value the statement of counsel that final determina-
tion must be made prior to March 18, it is obvious to any fair-minded
person that the issue could not conceivably be determined within that
period of time. '
RIGHT TO CRoss-EXAMINATION
An error which trial courts seem prone to commit 4 is the admission
into evidence of opinions of experts which are formulated in part from
documents or consultations with others. The import of such documents
or conferences is, of course, hearsay. For instance, a doctor who testifies
that it is his opinion that a defendant is sane, because of information in
the written reports of examining experts submitted to and reviewed by
him in forming his opinion, is giving an opinion the whole basis for
which is matter that is not before the court. Such testimony is not
merely an opinion, but necessarily brings in secret evidence which is
not subject to rebuttal or explanation.
In just such a case, our supreme court held that a defendant had
been denied valuable constitutional rights when the trial court refused
to permit cross-examination of the expert to determine if he was testi-
fying to his observations and conclusions or to the facts included in
various documents submitted to him by the prosecution.'-
The court did not inform us as to the specific constitutional basis
for its conclusion that valuable constitutional rights had been denied.
The Colorado Constitution guarantees to the accused the right to "meet
the witnesses against him face to face."" In addition, numerous deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States make it clear that the
use of secret evidence, not known to the defendant and consequently
not subject to rebuttal, renders a trial unfair and violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7
12 People ex rel. Bunker v, Blunt, 309 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1957).
13 Id at 202.
14 See Bauman v. People, 130 Colo. 248, 274 P.2d 591 (1954); Carter v. People,
119 Colo. 342. 204 P.2d 147 (1949); Graves v. People, 18 Colo. 170, 32 Pac. 63 (1893).
15 Archina v. People, 307 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957).
16 Colo. Const. art. II, § 16 (1876).
17 Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
4Comm'n, 301 US. 292 (1937); United States v. Abilene and So. R.R. 265 U.S. 274 (1924);
United States v. Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern R.R., 226 U.S. 14 (1912).
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RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
Two cases were decided by the court in which convicted men asked
for relief because they had not been represented by counsel. Tile court
sustained both convictions.
In the first case, Freeman v. Tinsley,'9 the opinion recites facts to
indicate that the defendant, Freeman, was young and inexperienced,
was speedily arraigned without counsel and without a reporter being
present, that he had been told by the police that he was charged with
larceny of an automobile and assault upon the owner, and that when
the charge was read by the clerk it turned out to be kidnapping-
an offense which is divided into several degrees involving technical
distinctions. Freeman had previously sought reversal of his conviction
on writ of error, unsuccessfully,"' and in the instant case was again in
the supreme court on writ of error to review the denial of his petition
for habeas corpus by the District Court of Pueblo County. Freeman
maintained that his conviction on a plea -of guilty in such circumnstances
denied to him rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
A comparison of the reported circumstances of the Freeman case
with those of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States20 suggests that Freeman's argument was well-conceived and that
his conviction probably did violate the fourteenth amendment as con-
strued by the nation's highest tribunal. Be that as it may, it appears
that any pronouncement on that issue by our court was dictum because
the court seems to have disposed of the case by applying a number of
earlier state decisions" holding that the only matters which may be
considered on a petition for habeas corpus are (1) whether the peti-
tioner was convicted in a court having jurisdiction of his person and of
the offense charged, and (2) whether the judgment and sentence were
within the statutory limitations.
In the second case raising the question of the right to be represented
by counsel, Vigil v. People, 2 in the court on writ of error to review the
conviction below, it was held that none of Vigil's constitutional rights
1s 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957).
19 Freeman v. People, 128 Colo. 99, 260 P.2d 603 (1953).
20 All cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States through 1955 in-
volving right to counsel in state criminal proceedings are collected and analyzed in
Hurst, The Right to Representation by Counsel Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
33 DICTA 39 (1956).
21 Rivera v. People, 128 Colo. 549, 266 P.2d 226 (1953); People ex rel. Metzger v.
District Court, 121 Colo. 141, 215 P.2d 327 (1949); Best v. People. 121 Colo. 100. 212 P.2d
1007 (1949).
22 310 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1957).
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had been denied. The opinion meagerly sets forth the circumstances of
the trial proceeding. Nothing appears in the opinion which would
indicate that Vigil had been unfairly proceeded against or could not
properly protect his rights without counsel. His conviction without
counsel does not seem to run counter to the standards of due process.
FORMER JEOPARDY
The court applied the prohibition against twice putting a person
in jeopardy for the same offense"4 to prevent a second prosecution of the
defendant for embezzlement. The defendant was first charged and con-
victed on an indictment charging embezzlement "between the dates of
May 24, 1953 and October 19, 1954." While the conviction was under
review by the supreme court, the defendant was again brought to trial
on a charge of embezzling from the same victim "on or about the second
day of January, 1954." The court ordered the second indictment dis-
missed, holding that when the.matter charged in the second indictment
is admissible as evidence under the first, and could have supported a
conviction, the person so charged is placed a second time in jeopardy
for the same offense.
24
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNOR'S DISCRETION
In a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, 25 the relator asked
the trial court to declare the office of the defendant vacant because the
defendant was not legally qualified to hold such office. The defendant
had been appointed pursuant to statutory authority to appoint as mem-
bers of the Board of Cosmetology persons who had had at least five years'
practical experience in the majority of practices of cosmetology. The
trial court sustained a motion to dismiss, and the supreme court affirmed,
on the ground that for the judiciary to interfere with the exercise of his
discretion by the chief executive "would be to impair or destroy the
three well-defined and long recognized independent departments of
government.'26 The court apparently had in mind, but did not allude
to, the mandate in the Colorado Constitution that neither of the branches
of the government shall exercise any of the powers of the other
branches.27 The result is consistent with prior decisions in Colorado.
2s
OTHER DECISIONS
Our court followed the Supreme Court of the United States in
holding invalid racial restrictive convenants relating to real property.
2 9
The court also followed a recent federal decision in holding that the
State must, as a matter of equal protection of the laws, provide at public
expense the bill of exceptions from the trial court to support a writ of
error. Where the writ of error is a matter of right, as in Colorado non-
capital criminal cases, the writ must be made available without regard
to the financial abilities of the defendant.8 0
23 Colo. Const. art. II, § 18 (1876).
24 Bustamante v. People, 317 P.2d 885 (Colo. 1957). Accord, Dill v. People, 19 Colo.
409, 36 Pac. 229 (1894).
25 People ex rel. Duncan v. Scott, 134 Colo. 525, 307 P.2d 191 (1957).
26 Id. at 529, 307 P.2d at 193.
27 Colo. Const. art III (1876).
28 E.g., People ex rel. Beardsley v. Harl, 109 Colo. 223, 124 P.2d 233 (1932).
29!Capitol Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 316 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957), following
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 3 A.L.R.2d 441 (1948) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953).
30 Petition of Jack Carver Patterson, 317 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1957), following Griffin v.
Illinois, 351, U.S. 12 (1957).
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In a case in which a fugitive from Alaska resisted extradition from
Colorado, the court held that neither the state nor the federal consti-
tution guarantees a right of asylum to a person who has committed a
crime in a territory and fled to another jurisdiction.3'
A lease arrangement between the City of Durango and a building
association, under which the association was to issue bonds and build a
recreational hall and the city was obligated to pay a yearly rental for
thirty-one years, pledging its property tax, cigarette tax and parking
meter revenues to pay the rent, with the association bondholders sub-
rogated to the rights of the association to sue the city for interest and
principal on the bonds, was held to be an indebtedness of the city and
subject to the constitutional limits on municipal debt. 2
I1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
During 1957 the supreme court decided eight cases in which it laid
down rules for taking evidence, preparing a record, and making find-
ings in administrative hearings.
NECESSITY FOR A COMPLETE RECORD
The court made it plain that in Colorado an agency holding a
judicial hearing must make a complete record of the proceeding. 33 Ina
hearing before the county commissioners in a liquor license application
case, no record was made. The hearing was not completed but con-
tinued to a later date. When the hearing was resumed, a reporter was
present and recorded the balance of the proceeding. The license appli-
cation was denied. The district court ordered the issuance of the license
and the supreme court reversed, saying, "(T) lie trial court had no
means of knowing, nor do we, whether the Board acted properly or
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application for license." 4
The reversal was accompanied with a remand directing the Board to
afford a new hearing and to keel) a complete record.
PRESUMPTION NOT EVIDENCE
In a workmen's compensation case,35 the claimant's proof included
no evidence indicating an accident arising out of and in the course of
31 Cutting v. Geer 313 P.2d 314. (Colo. 1957).
32 Deti v. Durango, 316 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1957) Colo. Const. art. XT, § 5.
33 County Comm'rs. of Fremont County v. Salardino, 318 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1957).
34 Id. at 597.
35 Industrial Comm'n v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co., 311 P.2d 705
(Colo. 1957).
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employment. The commission indulged, in its findings, a presumption
against suicide and held the respondents to proof "by conclusive evi-
dence" of suicide to overcome the presumption. Benefits were awarded.
The supreme court reversed, ruling that the claimant must prove his
claim. "The fact that there is a presumption against suicide does not
take the place of proof of an accident arising out of and in the course
of employment. " 36 It should be noted here that claimant's proof showed
only that deceased died on the employer's premises, on the ground below
an open fourth story window. The court apparently (lid not consider
such evidence to establish a prima facie case of accidental death occur-
ing during the course of and arising out of the employment because the
inference of suicide was equally as strong as the inference of accident.
HEARSAY, INCOMPETENT AND IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE
In another workmen's compensation case,"7 the claimant had twice
before been married before she married the deceased. Her marriage
to the deceased was evidenced by a marriage certificate. The defense
offered and the referee admitted into evidence a letter allegedly signed
by her second spouse which tended to establish that her second marriage
had never been dissolved by divorce, which, if proven, would have nega-
tived the claimant's dependency and resulted in the denial of benefits.
There was no evidence whatever in the record, other than the letter,
to indicate the invalidity of the claimant's marriage to the deceased.
The supreme court, in reversing the district court in vacating the award,
held the letter, as pure hearsay, to be incompetent and without proba-
tive effect. Since there was no other evidence concerning the invalidity
of the claimant's marriage to the deceased, the inference of validity-or,
as the court put it, the presumption of validity of the marriage-to the
.deceased was not met with any rebuttal evidence, and the claim of
dependency was established.
The County Commissioners of Larimer County denied an appli-
cation for a 3.2 beer license by Cloverleaf Kennel Club which was
located at least five miles from the nearest town." At the hearing,
some 150 persons attended, the residence of none of them being estab-
lished by the record. Introduced into evidence at the hearing were
letters and petitions objecting to the issuance of the license, such letters,
and petitions originating in towns from five to twenty-seven miles away
from the establishment seeking a license. At the hearing, the commis-
sioners called for a show of hands of those present who were for and
against the issuance of the license and, without a count, recorded their
impression that the majority of those present were opposed to the issu-
ance. The license was denied. The supreme court reversed and directed
the issuance of the license, saying:
"To summarize we hold: That the applicant established
a prima facie case entitling it to a liquor license; that the only
evidence to the contrary consisted of petitions and letters which
were incompetent and irrelevant and which the Board should
not have considered. With those letters and petitions stricken
from the record as they should have been, there remains before
36 Id. at 707.
37 Williams v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 95 (1957).




the Board only the prima facie evidence of the Club. On such
evidence the Board should have granted the application."' 9
The decision was based on a holding that a "neighborhood" was
the area adjacent to and homogeneous with the place sought to be
licensed, and that licenses were to be issued so as to fulfill the reason-
able needs of the neighborhood." Since the letters and petitions were
from people outside the neighborhood, they were incompetent and
irrelevant-irrelevant is the better term for them under the circum-
stances. And since there was no evidence to show where the people
attending the hearing resided, the show of hands for and against the
license was incompetent-without probative value as to the issue whether
the needs of the neighborhood were being reasonably served, because
without connecting the people with the neighborhood their testimony,
however given, proved nothing material to the case.
INADEQUATE STATEMENT OF FINDINGS
In two liquor license application cases arising in Denver, where
the ifanager of Safet' is the licensing authority, the court held that
denials of licenses must be reversed because the statement of the man-
ager's findings was either confusing or not supported by evidence in
the record of the proceeding.
In Geer v. Stalhopulos4 1 there were presented in evidence numerous
petitions in favor of the license and little if any evidence that the needs
of the neighborhood were adequately being served by existing licenses.
In his statement of his findings, the Manager stated, as grounds for
denial of the license, that "There are four (licenses) in this neighbor-
hood which adequately serve the reasonable requirements of the resi-
dents thereof." 42 Such information did not appear anywhere in the
record. In reversing the denial of the license, the court said:
"Now, the Manager may have informaton, either from his
records or from special knowledge, as to why four licenses are
enough to meet all needs of the area in question. If so, the
record and his findings and order fail to disclose such infor-
ination. Lacking such information, we shall not speculate as
to its existence and as to its quantum or weight in order to
uphold the Manager."
4 3
:1 Id. at 92 (emphasis supplied).
41Co!o. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-7 (1953).
41 309 P.2d 606 (Colo. 1957).
4 Id. at 608.
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The moral here seems to be that the manager, if he is going to
use special knowledge within his possession, must spread such infor-
mation on the record and give the applicant opportunity to explain
away or rebut any inferences adverse to him which may arise from such
information. Where such information appears for the first time in the
manager's statement of findings, his findings cannot be said to be sup-
ported by evidence in the record.
In a similar case, 44 where the written statement of findings was so
confusing that it could not be ascertained exactly what was found and
why, the court said:
"Administrative hearings should be decided according to
the evidence and the law. Findings of fact should be sufficient
in content to apprise the parties and the reviewing court of the
factual basis of the action of the administrative agency, so that
the parties and the reviewing tribunal may determine whether
the decision has support in the evidence and'in the law."4
These cases clearly require an administrative agency not only to
formulate a written statement of what was found, but to include in
such statement the evidentiary facts in the record which support the
conclusion.
OFFICIAL KNOWLEDGE-EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD
The Stathopulos case discussed in the section above could well be
included here, together with two cases in which the Industrial Com-
mission used its specialized knowledge or expert opinions of doctors,
not spread on the record and subject to rebuttal, in deciding to grant
or deny claims for workmen's compensation.
In one of the cases46 the evidence before the referee established that
the deceased had overexerted himself on the job, was a short time later
struck by a handcar, and died a few hours later of coronary thrombosis.
The referee's finding, showing the benefit of the expertness acquired
in his job, stated that lie was of the opinion that the exertion (omitting
44 Geer v. Presto, 313 P.2d 980 (Colo. 1.957).
4' Id. at 981.
46 Industrial Comm'n v. Harvens, 314 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1957).
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any reference to the blow and other testimony in the record) was not
the proximate cause of death:
"for the reason that overexertion is not ordinarily an element
of coronary occlusion as demonstrated by the fact that more
people that succumb to coronary occlusion do so while asleep
or at rest than while performing any manner of exercise ... '
The referee, therefore, concludes that overexertion was not a
factor in the death of (the deceased) .... 47
No evidence to that effect came in at the hearing and the conclusion
of the referee was, therefore, based entirely upon his own knowledge.
The referee's denial of the claim was reversed. A less than unanimous
court ruled that there was ample evidence to support a finding of causal
relationship between the overexertion and the blow and the death,
without expert medical testimony, and that the referee could not take
"judicial notice" of the extraneous non-evidentiary and prejudicial
information included in his finding and order.
Another workmen's compensation case48 found the referee falling
into the same error. The commission, on its own motion, had reopened
a case to determine if there had been any change of condition in the
disability of a claimant. Evidence was taken, all of which, in the form
of testimony of three surgeons, indicated an increase of five percent in
disability and that additional surgery probably would not effect any
improvement. After the hearing was concluded, the employer's doctor
made an examination and reported to the referee that in his opinion
the increase in disability could be caused by growths not related to the
accident, but that only exploratory surgery would reveal reliable infor-
mation. The Commission sustained the referee's order dismissing the
reopened case. Obviously, the ex parte statement of the employer's
doctor had been received and considered in deciding to dismiss the case.
Without mentioning the error of receiving and considering evidence
which was not introduced at the hearing and therefore not subject to
rebuttal or explanation, the court reversed the dismissal and directed
that an award be made for an additional five percent disability. It was
deemed error not to render a finding and order in accordance with the
evidence taken at the hearing.
47 Id. at 700.
4S Cain v. Industrial Comm. of Colo., 315 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1957).
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